Custom-made health-care: an experimental investigation by Keser, Claudia et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Custom-made health-care: an experimental
investigation
Claudia Keser1,2* , Claude Montmarquette2,3, Martin Schmidt1,4 and Cornelius Schnitzler1,5
Abstract
Background: Physicians’ financial interests might conflict with the best service to patients. It is essential to gain a
thorough understanding of the effect of remuneration systems on physician behaviour.
Methods: We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment using a within-subject design to investigate physician
behaviour underpayment heterogeneity. Each physician provided medical care to patients whose treatments were
paid for under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP).
Results: We observed that physicians customized their care in response to the payment system. FFS patients
received considerably more medical care than did CAP patients with the same illness and treatment preference.
Physicians over-served FFS patients and under-served CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction, we observed
neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover in FFS patients’ treatment.
Conclusions: The results suggest that, in our experimental model, fee regulation can be used to some extent to
control physician spending since we did not identify a behavioural response to the CAP payment cut. Physicians
did not recoup lost income by altering treatment behaviour toward CAP and/or FFS patients. Experimental
economics is an excellent tool for ensuring the welfare of all those involved in the health system. Further research
should investigate payment incentives as a means of developing health care teams that are more efficient.
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Background
Health care spending constitutes a significant share of
GDP. In 2018, it amounted to about 17% in the USA,
11% in Germany, and 9% in OECD countries [1]. A large
share of this money goes to the payment of health care
providers. Since physicians’ financial interests might
conflict with the best service to patients [2], it is essen-
tial to understand the effect of financial incentives on
physician behaviour.
There is extensive literature on this issue. In a theoret-
ical model, Ellis & McGuire [3] demonstrated that FFS
leads to an over-provision of medical services, whereas
CAP results in an under-provision. Numerous empirical
studies have shown that physicians tend to respond to fi-
nancial incentives in this way [4–8].
In an early controlled laboratory experiment on finan-
cial incentives to health care providers, Fan et al. [9] in-
vestigated physicians’ provision of virtual medical
services under two alternative methods for controlling
the cost of physician services under global budgeting.
They found that subjects provided more medical services
under the expenditure-cap policy than under the
expenditure-target method. In a seminal paper, Hennig-
Schmidt, Selten & Wiesen ([10], HSW hereafter) studied
the effect of the two alternative remuneration systems,
fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP), on the quan-
tity of medical services provided by physicians. FFS is a
volume-based physician payment system in which physi-
cians are paid separately for each unit of medical service
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rendered. Under CAP, physicians receive a lump-sum
payment for a patient’s treatment, irrespective of the
quantity of services rendered. In the experiment, medical
students decided on the quantity of medical services to
be provided to each virtual patient on a given patient
list. HSW (2011) shows that physicians paid via FFS pro-
vided more medical services than those paid via CAP.
Furthermore, FFS physicians tended to over-serve pa-
tients, while capitated physicians had a propensity to
under-serve patients.
In our paper, we present an experiment that builds on
the study by HSW (2011) by extending it in two direc-
tions, payment heterogeneity and fee regulation (i.e., a
cut in the lump-sum payment under CAP). HSW (2011)
examined treatment decisions in a setting where physi-
cians faced a single payment system, either FFS or CAP.
Since physicians in real life frequently face multiple pay-
ment systems, we tested the robustness of the findings
in HSW (2011) by creating an environment with pay-
ment heterogeneity. In our experiment, each physician
faced patients under both payment systems, FFS and
CAP. In this heterogeneous payment setting, we wanted
to investigate whether physicians customize care in re-
sponse to financial incentives at the individual patient
level or provide ready-to-wear treatment [11], that is, a
one-for-all approach rather than selecting treatment on
a patient-by-patient basis.
Our experiment’s heterogeneous setting also made
studying the effect of fee regulation more interesting
than it would be in a homogeneous setting. At one point
in the experiment, we announced a reduction in the
lump-sum payment for all patients under CAP to ex-
plore whether and how the physicians would react to
such a reduction. We were not only interested in
whether physicians tried to offset the lost income by re-
ducing the provision of care to CAP patients, but also
whether the lump-sum payment reduction had any
(spillover) effect on their provision behaviour under FFS.
In the experiment, each FFS patient received consider-
ably more medical care than did the corresponding CAP
patient with the same illness and treatment preference.
On average, FFS patients received more than twice as
many medical services as CAP patients. In general, phy-
sicians over-served FFS patients and under-served CAP
patients. However, we did not identify any behavioural
response to the CAP payment cut. We detected no
quantity offset under CAP nor spillover under FFS. This
suggests that, in our experimental model, fee regulation
can be used to some extent as a means of controlling
spending on physician services without reducing the
overall quantity of care. This element brings added value
to all recent experimental studies using the basic experi-
mental platform developed by HSW (2011). In addition
to the typical concerns regarding doctors and patients’
benefits, it involves something of use to the taxpayers
who pay for the public health system. We are aware of
one recent study by Brosig-Koch et al. [12] that intro-
duces a variety of bonus pay amounts to a CAP payment
system. The results of this study suggest that, in keeping
with Keser et al. [13], performance pay may enhance the
quality of care. In addition, they suggest that the size of
the bonus does not matter, which is in keeping with our
finding. Interestingly, under the FFS payment system, Di
Guida et al. [14] observe that fee size has an effect on
over-provision.
Following Ellis & McGuire [3], the theoretical model-
ling of physicians’ behaviour should be based on the as-
sumption that they take both their financial interests
and their patients’ interests into account. Therefore, to
acquire some understanding of individual decision heu-
ristics, we provide a classification of the physicians in
our experiment based on their tendencies to maximize
patient benefit or maximize their profit under each of
the two payment systems. About half of the physicians
are classified as profit maximizers, while most remaining
physicians exhibit mixed motives. Benefit maximizers
exist but are rare. This result relates to Godager & Wie-
sen [15], who find, based on the data of HSW (2011),
“substantial variation in the degree of physician altruism”.
Also, Martinsson & Persson [16] observe heterogeneity in
altruism across physicians in their experiment; also, physi-
cians’ degree of altruism varies across patients with differ-
ent medical needs. Reif et al. [17] added to their
experiment a third party representing the health insurance
that finances medical service provision and find that phy-
sicians also consider the payoffs to the third party.
We are aware that the empirical literature on physician
behaviour has reported conduct such as self-selection,
cream-skimming, and adjustments to practice size in re-
sponse to payment systems. However, our study focussed
exclusively on the quantity of medical services provided.
We used a standardized list of patients in our experiment
to guarantee the comparability of the volume of services
provided to similar patients under the two payment sys-
tems, before and after the CAP payment reduction.
Methods
Experimental model
Participants provided medical care to 36 sequentially
presented virtual patients in a heterogeneous payment
environment. The patients were presented in two se-
quences of 18 patients each, S1 and S2. In each of the
two sequences, physicians faced patients whose treat-
ments were paid for under either FFS or CAP. Under
FFS, participants were paid separately for each unit of
medical services provided. Under CAP, participants re-
ceived a lump-sum payment, irrespective of the number
of services provided. The payment system varied on a
Keser et al. Health Economics Review           (2020) 10:41 Page 2 of 12
patient-by-patient basis. The two sequences, S1 and S2,
comprised similar patients and differed exclusively in the
lump-sum payment amount under CAP.
Each participant decided on the quantity q ϵ {0, 1, …,
10} of medical services to be provided to each patient.
Treatment choices impacted both physician profit and
patient benefit. Remuneration, profit, and patient benefit
were measured in experimental currency units (ECUs).
The virtual patients were characterized by three attri-
butes: payment system, illness, and treatment preference.
The first attribute, the payment system, was either FFS
or CAP. The second patient attribute was an illness. Pa-
tients suffered from one of three potential illnesses: A, B,
or C. Illness impacted the FFS fee function, and thus the
physician’s profit under FFS. We used three of the FFS
fee functions examined by HSW (2011), which were
chosen using reference points from the German scale of
charges and fees for physician services. In contrast to
Brosig-Koch et al. [18], there was no attempt to keep
profit level and marginal profit under FFS and CAP dir-
ectly comparable. In our experimental protocol, such
control would not have been sustainable with the reduc-
tion in CAP payment.
We used the same FFS fee functions to characterize
the patients in S1 and S2. For each illness, remuneration
under FFS increased along with the number of medical
services provided (see Table 1). Illness did not have an
impact on remuneration under CAP. The lump-sum
payment under CAP was independent of both illness
and the number of services provided. However, it dif-
fered across S1 and S2, decreasing from 12.00 ECU in
S1 to 9.60 ECU in S2 (20% decrease).
The third patient attribute was treatment preference.
We distinguished between three patient types, each
characterized by a particular treatment preference, with
different benefit functions (B1(q), B2(q), B3(q)). These
were adopted from HSW (2011). The patient benefit
function Bi(q) describes the benefit that a patient of type
i (i ϵ {1, 2, 3}) draws from treatment quantity q and was
measured in ECU. The different benefit functions imply
that patients, independent of illness, respond differently
to treatment quantity. The same benefit functions were
used to characterize the patients in S1 and S2.
Each of the three benefit functions was designed to
have a global optimum qi*, which determined the treat-
ment preference, i.e., the “right” amount of medical care
for each patient type. Specifying global optima in the in-
terior of the action space allowed us to observe any po-
tential over- and under-provision of medical care for
each patient type.
The benefit functions for type 1 and type 2 patients
were designed such that the monetary benefit drop-off
from the optimal level was smaller in the case of over-
provision than in the case of under-provision. The re-
verse was true for the monetary benefit of type 3 pa-
tients (see Fig. 1 or Additional file 1: Table B1).
The patients in our experiment were characterized by
two payment systems, three illnesses, and three types of
treatment preferences. Each of the 2 × 3 × 3 combina-
tions of payment system, illness, and preference repre-
sented an individual patient in each of the two
sequences. Participants thus faced a heterogeneous pa-
tient population with 18 individual patients showing dif-
ferent characteristics in each of the two sequences.
Under this design, half of the patients in a sequence
were treated under FFS and the other half under CAP.
The patients were passive and fully insured, accepting
any quantity of medical services provided. Physicians’
treatment choices impacted both patient benefit and
physician profit. Physicians were confronted with a con-
vex cost function, c (qj) = 0.1 qj
2, where qj is the amount
of medical services provided to patient j. This function
was, again, adopted from HSW (2011). The cost function
remained unaffected by the payment system, illness, pa-
tient type, and sequence, implying that it was the same
for treating all patients in the experiment.
Physician profit under FFS varied across illnesses and
was identical in both sequences. Profit under CAP
remained unaffected by illness but varied across se-
quences (see Fig. 2 or Additional file 1: Table B2). The
FFS functions were designed such that the profit func-
tion displayed a trade-off between maximum patient
benefit and maximum physician profit in all cases but
one (FFS patient type 1 with illness A). Under CAP, phy-
sicians had to deviate from the profit-maximizing quan-
tity to create patient benefit.
Table 1 Physician remuneration (in ECU)
Quantity of medical services
Rem. syst. Seq. Illness 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FFS S1,S2 A 0.00 1.70 3.40 5.10 5.80 10.50 11.00 12.10 13.50 14.90 16.60
FFS S1,S2 B 0.00 1.80 3.60 5.40 7.20 9.00 10.80 12.60 14.40 16.20 18.30
FFS S1,S2 C 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.20 15.00 16.90 18.90 21.30 23.60
CAP S1 A,B,C 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
CAP S2 A,B,C 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60
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Experimental procedure
We conducted the experiment at the CIRANO lab in
Montreal, Canada, using the z-Tree software program
[19]. Participants were 23 students with an academic
background in a health care discipline.
Before the experiment, the procedure was as follows: Partici-
pants and the experimenter gathered in a conference room
where the instructions (see online Additional file 1) were dis-
tributed and read out to participants. From this moment on,
participants were not allowed to communicate with each
other and were instructed to refrain from publicly raising
questions regarding the instructions. Each participant was ran-
domly assigned to one of the isolated workstations in the la-
boratory. The layout of the workstations made visual contact
and communication between participants impossible.
After reading the instructions, participants were pre-
sented with a programmed questionnaire regarding the
instructions. The experimenter was available to resolve
any open questions regarding the instructions individu-
ally. The experiment began once all participants cor-
rectly answered all the questions on the questionnaire.
Participants were informed in the instructions that the
aggregate patient benefit would be donated to a charit-
able health care organization. This was designed to
encourage them to take patient benefits into account. At
the beginning of the experiment, each participant se-
lected a charitable health care organization (Canadian
Cancer Society, Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada, or
Parkinson Society of Canada). After the experiment,
each participant received an electronic transfer confirm-
ation of the donation to the individually chosen
organization.
In the experiment, participants allocated medical ser-
vices to 36 virtual patients in two consecutive sequences.
Patients were presented one after the other in each se-
quence. The patients’ order was randomized in the first
sequence (S1) and repeated in the second sequence (S2).
The relevant payment system was revealed for each pa-
tient. Neither illness nor patient type, however, was spe-
cified in detail. Each virtual patient was presented as a
table that listed the physician profit and patient benefit
associated with the patient’s characteristics for each pos-
sible quantity of medical services. Participants decided
on the quantity of medical services based on these num-
bers. Between the first and second sequence, participants
were notified of a lump-sum payment reduction under
CAP. Participants carried on with the experiment after
acknowledging the payment cut.
Fig. 1 Patient benefit functions in ECU
Fig. 2 Physician profit functions
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For each participant, physician profit and patient benefit
were tallied up separately and converted into CAN$, apply-
ing a conversion factor of CAN$0.02 per ECU. As communi-
cated in the instructions, each participant privately received,
in cash, a payment from the experiment in addition to a
CAN$5.00 show-up fee at the end of the experiment. The
patient benefits generated by participants who had selected
the same charitable health care organization were pooled
and donated to the respective organization.
We conducted two experimental sessions, with 10 and
13 participants, respectively. Each session lasted approxi-
mately 75 min. Participants earned, on average,
CAN$18.27, including the show-up fee. The donations
(of the aggregate patient benefit) to the charitable health
care organizations totaled CAN$239.47.
Hypotheses
An individual who disregarded the effect of their treat-
ment decisions on patient benefit would maximize profit
by generating zero ECUs, irrespective of the amount of
the lump-sum payment, under capitation, and 5 or 10
ECUs, depending on the patient’s illness, under FFS.
However, the findings of HSW (2011) show that experi-
mental physicians do take patient benefit into account,
which we should also expect from real-life physicians
due to professional ethics. Consequently, we anticipate
that our experiment subjects will choose to provide
more than zero units of medical care to CAP patients
and deviate from the profit-maximizing quantities for
FFS patients.
In keeping with HSW (2011), Hennig-Schmidt & Wie-
sen [20], Brosig-Koch et al. [18, 21] and Wang et al.
[22], as well as the theoretical predictions of Ellis &
McGuire [3], we expect experimental physicians to over-
serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP patients, thus
providing more services to FFS patients than similar
CAP patients in our experiment.
Hypothesis 1
In a heterogeneous payment environment, physicians
over-serve patients whose treatments are paid for under
FFS, and under-serve those whose treatments are paid
for under CAP.
Frank & Zeckhauser [11] empirically showed that, in the
case of depression, some physicians engage in highly sub-
optimal therapeutic practices (a one-for-all approach),
while others customize care, depending on the costs of
doing so. Hypothesis 1 directly implies Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2
Physicians do customize care in response to the payment
system in a heterogeneous payment environment: in
each sequence, physicians provide more medical services
to FFS than to CAP patients.
The theoretical analysis by Ellis & McGuire [3] was
based on the assumption that the utility function of a
physician includes both the patient’s benefit and the
physician’s profit. Given this assumption, we expect, for
the lump-sum payment reduction under CAP, a reduc-
tion in the quantities of services provided to CAP pa-
tients. We also anticipate an impact on FFS patients’
treatment decisions since physicians could use the “FFS
market” as an avenue to make up for lost CAP income
[23–25]. Hypotheses 3 and 4 follow.
Hypothesis 3
Physicians’ provision behaviour is affected by an ex-ante
payment reduction under capitation. Physicians do alter
their treatment behaviour toward FFS and CAP patients
in order to recoup lost income. We expect a decline in
CAP patients’ treatment quantities and a spillover effect
in the FFS payment system.
Hypothesis 4
On an individual level, some physicians will be profit-
oriented, while others will be patient benefit-oriented.
Classification of individual physician behaviours
To examine whether individual physicians showed any
tendencies to maximize patient benefit or physician
profit, we constructed two qualitative evaluation criteria.
The first criterion looks at whether a physician tends to
maximize patient benefit. This criterion applies to the
treatment of both CAP and FFS patients. We calculated
the average number of services provided to patients of
the same patient type, payment system, and sequence
for each physician. Each combination of payment system
and sequence yielded three measures, one for each pa-
tient type. Using these measures, we concluded that a
physician was “benefit-oriented” (under a payment sys-
tem in a given sequence) if the average number of med-
ical services increased along with the patient type’s need
for medical attention.
The second criterion identifies a potential tendency to
maximize physician profit. This criterion applies to the
treatment of FFS patients. We compared, for each phys-
ician, the average number of treatments provided to FFS
patients in a sequence suffering from illness A, with the
average quantities provided to FFS patients suffering
from illness B or C. We concluded that a physician was
“profit-oriented” if the average quantity provided to pa-
tients suffering from illness B or C (who should be max-
imally treated to maximize the physician’s profit)
exceeded the average number of services provided to pa-
tients suffering from illness A (who should be treated
with 5 units to maximize the physician’s profit).
Table 2 shows, for each physician, the observed ten-
dencies (benefit-oriented under CAP and FFS, and
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profit-oriented under FFS) in each of the two sequences.
A checkmark indicates that the individual physician dis-
played the orientation in question, while an X implies
that the individual physician did not exhibit it.
The physicians are classified into three broad categor-
ies: benefit maximizers, profit maximizers and (regular)
mixed-motive deciders. We identified a physician as a
benefit maximizer if the physician (in a given sequence)
was benefit-oriented under both payment systems and
not profit-oriented. In S1 (S2), we found two (one) bene-
fit maximizers.
We identified a physician as a profit maximizer if the
physician’s provision behaviour was profit-oriented with-
out maximizing benefit. We found 11 (14) profit maxi-
mizers in S1 (S2). Note that these profit maximizers,
except for two (physicians #13 and #19), generated on
average at least 90% of the optimal profit over the two
sequences.
We identified a physician as a (regular) mixed-motive
decider if the physician’s observed treatment behaviour
was benefit-oriented under CAP, exclusively, and profit-
oriented under FFS. We observe five (two) mixed-motive
deciders in S1 (S2).
A small number of physicians did not fall into any of
the three categories. Three (four) physicians were
benefit-oriented for both CAP and FFS and profit-
oriented at the same time. In addition, a single physician
(#9) was benefit-oriented for FFS but not for CAP pa-
tients and profit-oriented at the same time, in both se-
quences. Another physician (#3) was benefit-oriented for
FFS patients in S1 but not in S2.
Classification result
One out of two physicians can be classified as a profit
maximizer. Benefit maximizers occur but are rare. The
remaining physicians show mixed motives; only a few of
them are consistent in their tendencies. These classifica-
tion results are in line with Hypothesis 4.
Results
Our analysis of the experimental data relied on non-
parametric methods. Such methods are particularly suit-
able when the sample size is small, and data are not as-
sumed to result from prescribed models (the normal
distribution model, for example). The non-parametric
analysis is often the preferred method for comparing
Table 2 Behavioural tendencies
Physician
#
Patient benefit-oriented Profit oriented Patient benefit-oriented Profit-oriented
CAP@1 FFS@1 FFS@1 CAP@2 FFS@2 FFS@2
1 ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓
2 X X ✓ X X ✓
3 X ✓ X X X X
4 X X ✓ X X ✓
5 ✓ X ✓ X X ✓
6 X X ✓ X X ✓
7 X X ✓ X X ✓
8 X X ✓ X X ✓
9 X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓
10 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓
11 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X
12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
13 ✓ X ✓ X X ✓
14 ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
15 X X ✓ X X ✓
16 X X ✓ X X ✓
17 ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓
18 X X ✓ X X ✓
19 ✓ X ✓ X X ✓
20 X X ✓ X X ✓
21 X X ✓ X X ✓
22 X X ✓ ✓ X ✓
23 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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different treatments in an experimental study since it re-
lies on ordinal data that are often not very sensitive to
numerical data changes.
Table 3 provides an overview of the summary statis-
tics. Figure 3 graphs the average number of medical ser-
vices provided by the experimental physicians to each
patient (characterized by the combination of illness and
treatment preference) in both sequences (S1 and S2) and
payment systems (FFS and CAP). It also indicates the
profit-maximizing quantity and the right amount of
medical care for each patient.
In this section, we analyze the over-or under-provision
of services to patients under FFS and CAP in both se-
quences (Section 3.1), the customization of care (Section
3.2), the effect of a CAP payment reduction (Section
3.3), physician profit (Section 3.4), and patient benefit
(Section 3.5). Our non-parametric analyses were based
on 23 independent observations. All tests were two-
sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (WTs).
Over- or under-provision of medical services
Figure 3 above shows customization in response to the
heterogeneity in the payment system, but it also suggests
ready-to-wear treatment for patients with illness B or C
under FFS (whose treatment provides maximum phys-
ician profit with the maximum quantity) and type 1 and
3 CAP patients. Under CAP, a level of treatment for type
2 patients similar to the one observed for types 1 and 3
would be higher than the treatment that maximizes the
patient’s benefit.
We observed that for seven of the nine patients under
FFS, the average treatment level in both sequences
exceeded the corresponding correct amount of medical
care. FFS patients were over-served when the profit-
maximizing quantity exceeds the patient’s optimal quan-
tity of treatment.
We also observed that, in each sequence, the average
level of treatment provided to the six FFS patients with a
profit-maximizing quantity of 10 was roughly the same
(around 8), irrespective of the patient’s illness and pref-
erence for medical attention. This implies that the extent
of over-provision to these patients is higher, the lower
the patient’s need for medical attention. For instance,
FFS patients B-3 and C-3, who needed extensive medical
attention, received just a little more medical service than
optimal. In contrast, FFS patients B-2 and C-2, in need
of limited medical attention, were considerably over-
served.
Two FFS patients in both sequences, characterized by
the attributes A-1 and A-3, received fewer medical ser-
vices than optimal. While the FFS patient labeled A-1
was only marginally under-served (the correct amount
of medical services coincides with the profit-maximizing
quantity), the FFS patient labeled A-3 received signifi-
cantly fewer services than optimal (the optimal amount
of medical care for this FFS patient exceeds the profit-
maximizing quantity).
CAP patients were under-served in all cases. The aver-
age number of medical services provided to the nine
CAP patients in both sequences fell below the optimal
amount of care for the respective patients. In each se-
quence, the average number of medical services provided
to type 1 and 3 CAP patients was roughly the same, irre-
spective of the patient’s need for medical attention. The
degree of under-provision depended on the patient type.
Type 3 CAP patients, in need of extensive medical atten-
tion, were considerably under-served. In contrast, type 2
CAP patients in need of minor medical attention were
under-served to a considerably lower degree.
To gain statistical evidence regarding the under- or
over-provision of medical attention to FFS and CAP pa-
tients, we examined the individual physicians’ average
treatment decisions. Additional file 1: Table C.1 lists, for
each physician, the average treatment quantity, along
with the mean deviation from the correct amount of
medical services over all the decisions regarding patients
of the same payment system (FFS or CAP) and sequence
(S1 or S2). It is obvious that in both sequences of the ex-
periment more services than optimal were given to FFS
patients: in each sequence, the mean deviation from the
correct number of medical services for FFS patients is
positive for 21 of the 23 physicians, while one is negative
and one is zero. This implies that under FFS, physicians
tended to significantly over-provide (S1, S2: p < 0.01;
WTs). Analysis of the mean deviation for CAP patients
shows that CAP patients received significantly fewer ser-
vices than optimal in each sequence. The mean deviation
is negative for 21 (22) physicians in S1 (S2), implying
Table 3 Summary statistics
FFS@S1 FFS@S2 CAP@S1 CAP@S2
Quantity of treatment
Average 6.95 6.90 3.22 3.14
Median 7.00 7.00 3.00 3.00
SD 2.25 2.35 1.95 1.95
Profit (ECU)
Average 9.08 8.97 10.59 8.23
SD 2.63 2.84 1.36 1.25
% Max profita 50.2 48.3 13.5 15.5
Patient benefit (ECU)
Average 8.04 7.95 6.54 6.39
SD 1.93 2.07 3.99 4.04
% Max patient benefitb 26.6 24.2 44.4 42.5
aPercent of individual treatment decisions coinciding with
profit-maximizing quantity
bPercent of individual treatment decisions resulting in maximum
patient benefit
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that under CAP, physicians tended to significantly
under-provide (S1, S2: p < 0.01; WTs).
Result 1
In a heterogeneous payment environment, physicians
over-served patients whose treatments are paid under
FFS and under-served those whose treatments are paid
under CAP. Over- and under-provision depended on the
patient type and thus on the patient’s need for medical
attention. Under FFS, over-provision was higher, the
lower the need for medical attention. Under CAP,
under-provision increased as the need for medical atten-
tion increased. The results confirm Hypothesis 1.
Customization of care?
Figure 3 shows that, in both sequences, each type of FFS
patient received considerably more medical attention
than the CAP counterpart with the same illness. On
average, physicians provided 6.95 (6.90) units of medical
services to FFS patients and 3.22 (3.14) units to CAP pa-
tients in S1 (S2). Thus, they provided, on average, over
twice as many medical services to FFS patients than to
CAP patients in both sequences (S1, S2: p < 0.01; WTs
based on Additional file 1: Table C.1).
Result 2
In each sequence, physicians provided more medical ser-
vices to FFS than to CAP patients. Our findings thus re-
fute the notion that physicians develop a one-for-all
approach to providing medical care. Physicians did
customize care according to the payment system in a
heterogeneous payment environment, confirming Hy-
pothesis 2.
CAP payment reduction
Our study’s major concern was to analyze the potential
impact of a lump-sum payment reduction on physician
provision behaviour. We investigated whether it leads to
a quantity reduction to CAP patients and/or spillover
concerning the treatment of FFS patients. Note that the
patients’ optimal amount of medical care and profit-
maximizing quantity remained unaffected by the CAP
reduction.
Looking at Fig. 3 and comparing the average quantity
for patients with the same payment system, illness, and
treatment preferences across sequences, we find that
physician treatment behaviour toward FFS and CAP pa-
tients remained practically unaffected by the lump-sum
payment reduction in S2. Comparing the average quan-
tity provided by each physician to patients of the same
payment system across sequences substantiates this ob-
servation. We do not find a significant difference in
treatment behaviour across sequences for either FFS or
CAP patients (WTs).
When we analyze individual treatment decisions for
matching pairs of patients (illness and treatment prefer-
ences) in the same payment system across sequences,
the comparison of individual treatment decisions shows
no significant difference in treatment behaviour toward
FFS or CAP patients across sequences (WTs).
Result 3
In contrast to Hypothesis 3, physicians’ provision behav-
iour remained virtually unaffected by an ex-ante pay-
ment reduction under capitation. Physicians did not
alter their treatment behaviour toward FFS and CAP pa-
tients to recoup lost income. We observed neither a de-
cline in treatment quantities regarding CAP patients nor
a spillover effect in the FFS payment system.
Fig. 3 Average number of medical services per individual patient (characterized by illness [A – C] and patient type [1–3])
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Physician profit
In the experiment, physicians earned an average of
331.81 ECU (median 340.50 ECU; ranging from 257.10
ECU to 373.80 ECU), implying that the average phys-
ician profit amounts to 88.8% of the maximum achiev-
able profit of 373.80 ECU. One single participant,
physician #7, realized the maximum achievable profit.
Five out of the 23 physicians (#2, #21, #16, #4 and #7;
21.7% of all physicians) brought in 95% or more of the
maximum achievable profit.
Table 3 shows that physicians earned, on average, 9.08
ECU (8.97 ECU) per FFS patient and 10.59 ECU (8.23
ECU) per CAP patient in S1 (S2). Under FFS, the ob-
served averages are 8.9% (10%) lower than the average
maximum attainable profit of 9.97 ECU per patient (re-
member that a patient’s illness impacts the FFS profit
function); under CAP, the observed averages are 11.8%
(14.3%) lower than the maximum profit of 12.00 ECU
(9.60 ECU) per patient (profit under CAP remains un-
affected by illness; lump-sum payments differ across se-
quences) in S1 (S2). Physicians gave up relatively more
money relative to the maximum attainable profit under
CAP than under FFS. For each physician, looking at the
relative deviation of their profit from the maximum
achievable profit, averaged over all patients of the same
payment system, we find the relative deviation under
CAP significantly larger than under FFS (S1, S2: p < 0.01;
WTs).
To investigate whether the payment system affected
the decision to choose the profit-maximizing treatment
quantity, see Table 3. Under FFS, approximately half of
each sequence’s individual treatment decisions coincided
with the respective profit-maximizing quantity. In con-
trast, fewer than one in seven (six) individual treatment
decisions resulted in maximum physician profit under
CAP in S1 (S2). WTs based on the percentage of profit-
maximizing decisions by each physician show that the
relative share of profit-maximizing treatment decisions
in each sequence is significantly larger under FFS than
under CAP (S1, S2: p < 0.01).
Result 4
In the experiment, nearly one-quarter of the physicians
earned 95% or more of the maximum attainable profit, indi-
cating that they likely worked hard to maximize their overall
profit. The payment system used to pay for a patient’s treat-
ment influenced the physicians’ choice of profit-maximizing
treatment quantities: while about half of all decisions under
FFS maximized payoff, maximization occurred only occa-
sionally under CAP (in both sequences).
Patient benefit
Table 3 shows an average patient benefit of 8.04 ECU
(7.95 ECU) for FFS patients and 6.54 ECU (6.39 ECU)
for CAP patients in S1 (S2). The average benefits ob-
served were thus somewhat lower for CAP patients than
for FFS patients. Had physicians always acted in the pa-
tients’ best interest by providing the correct amount of
medical care in every instance, both FFS and CAP pa-
tients could have received a maximum average benefit of
9.82 ECU (the experimental design distinguishes be-
tween three patient types with different benefit func-
tions). In short, patients did not regularly receive
optimal care (see Section 3.1).
To substantiate this finding, consider, for each phys-
ician, the average benefit received by FFS and CAP pa-
tients in each of the two sequences. WTs, based on
comparisons of these averages with the maximum aver-
age patient benefit, show that patients under each pay-
ment system in each sequence received a significantly
smaller benefit from medical treatment than under opti-
mal treatment (FFS@S1, FFS@2, CAP@1, CAP@2: p <
0.01).
Table 3 lists the physicians’ relative shares of individ-
ual treatment decisions that resulted in optimal patient
benefit. In each sequence, we find that roughly one in
four individual treatment decisions (S1: 26.6%; S2:
24.2%) for FFS patients resulted in optimal patient bene-
fit. However, 44.4% in S1 (42.5% in S2) of CAP patients’
individual treatment decisions resulted in optimal treat-
ment. Comparing the relative share of optimal treatment
decisions across payment systems for each physician, we
find, for each sequence, the physicians’ relative share of
optimal treatment decisions to be significantly larger for
CAP than for FFS patients (S1, S2: p < 0.01; WTs).
To further assess the impact of the payment system on pa-
tient benefit, we look at the relative patient benefit loss,
which is defined as the patient benefit loss (the difference be-
tween the maximum attainable patient benefit and the actual
observed patient benefit) relative to the maximum achievable
benefit. Analyzing the relative patient benefit loss averaged
over all individual treatment decisions under the same pay-
ment system and sequence, we find in each sequence that
FFS patients fared considerably better than CAP patients,
despite the higher proportion of optimal treatment decisions
for CAP than for FFS patients (Section 3.1).
Table 4 reports the relative patient benefit loss aver-
aged over patients of the same illness but distinguished
by type and the combination of payment system and se-
quence. It shows that in each sequence, type 1 FFS pa-
tients (in need of intermediate medical attention) and
type 3 FFS patients (in need of extensive medical atten-
tion) did considerably better than their CAP counter-
parts (both, S1, S2: p < 0.01; WTs based on averages per
physician). On the contrary, type 2 CAP patients (in
need of minor medical attention) fared slightly better in
S1 (p = 0.088) or roughly the same in S2 (p = 0.408) as
their FFS counterparts.
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To conclude, patients in need of intermediate or ex-
tensive medical attention fared better under FFS. Those
in need of relatively little medical attention, though, if
they experienced any effect of the payment system at all,
suffered a lower benefit loss under CAP.
With regard to the effect of the lump-sum payment re-
duction under CAP, the lack of a significant behavioural
volume response (Result 3) suggests that the patient benefit
of FFS and CAP patients should remain largely unaffected.
A comparison of the average benefit for patients of the
same remuneration system across sequences supports this
prediction. We found no significant change in the average
patient benefit for FFS and CAP patients following the
lump-sum payment reduction (see Table 3). For each phys-
ician, in terms of statistical evaluation, consider the average
patient benefit for patients of the same payment system
across sequences. The analysis showed no significant differ-
ence for either FFS or CAP patients (WTs).
We reported an insignificant change in the relative
share of individual treatment decisions leading to opti-
mal patient benefit for both FFS and CAP patients (see
Table 3). Comparing, for each physician, the relative
share of optimal treatment decisions for patients under
the same payment system across sequences, we found
no significant difference (WTs).
Comparing the average relative patient benefit loss for
each patient type under FFS and CAP across sequences
revealed minimal changes in response to the lump-sum
payment reduction. Type 1 and 3 FFS patients fared
slightly worse in S2 compared to S1 (see Table 4), while
the average relative patient benefit loss for type 2 pa-
tients under FFS remained unaffected. Under CAP, type
1 patients fared slightly better, while type 2 and 3 pa-
tients fared slightly worse in S2 than S1. We did not find
a significant difference when comparing the relative pa-
tient benefit loss for each physician over patients of the
same type and payment system across sequences.
Result 5
Despite a higher proportion of CAP’s optimal treatment
decisions than for FFS patients, patients ended up with a
significantly lower benefit under CAP than under FFS.
Benefit losses were significantly higher for CAP than for
FFS patients in the case of patients in need of intermedi-
ate to major medical attention (two-thirds of our pa-
tients); this was not true for those in need of minor
medical attention (one-third of our patients). This sug-
gests that the overall benefit loss depends on the specific
mix of patients with different needs. The CAP lump-
sum payment reduction had no effect on treatment deci-
sions, either for patients under CAP or under FFS. This
is important news regarding opportunities for increasing
taxpayer benefits by reducing costs under CAP.
Discussion
Findings and added value of our research
Our study adds to the existing experimental research by
HSW (2011) on physician treatment behaviour [10] by in-
corporating a heterogeneous payment system, which is a
prominent characteristic of markets for physician services
in a number of countries (e.g., the United States). We did
not directly compare pure FFS and pure CAP environ-
ments but instead focussed on physician behaviour in a
heterogeneous practice environment where physicians
faced comparable patients under FFS and CAP.
Our findings demonstrate the robustness of the results
obtained by HSW (2011), more specifically, the tendency
to over-serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP pa-
tients. We also investigated the effect of a CAP lump-
sum payment reduction in a heterogeneous environment
and found neither a direct effect on the treatment of
CAP patients nor a spillover effect on FFS patients’
treatment.
Thus, our study complements the existing empirical
and theoretical literature on the effects of financial in-
centives on physician behaviour. Our experimental study
involved basic economic research and did not assess ac-
tual physician behaviour in the real world. Although the
findings cannot be directly applied to real-world issues,
they might provide valuable insights to those attempting
to design new institutions. Laboratory experiments allow
us to test the functioning of incentive schemes that do
not yet exist in real life. They enable much tighter con-
trol than empirical studies or field experiments. Labora-
tory experiments are thus considered a useful
complement to theoretical and empirical studies as well
as field experiments.
If health care policy is to be designed effectively, there
must be an in-depth consideration of the effects of pay-
ment system heterogeneity on physician provision be-
haviour. Potential system-wide effects of fee regulation,
targeting the reimbursement of treatment for one sub-
group of patients, should be examined as well.
In our experimental environment, we found that phy-
sicians customized care in response to the heteroge-
neous payment system. A patient’s medical treatment
was affected by the payment system used to compensate
the attending physician. In the experiment, an FFS pa-
tient received considerably more medical care than the
corresponding CAP patient with the same illness and
Table 4 Patient benefit loss relative to the maximum possible
FFS@S1 FFS@S2 CAP@S1 CAP@S2
Type 1 0.136 0.146 0.387 0.363
Type 2 0.209 0.209 0.162 0.211
Type 3 0.198 0.216 0.46 0.481
Average 0.181 0.19 0.336 0.352
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treatment preference. We also observed physicians over-
serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP patients. Over-
provision and under-provision depended on the patient’s
need for medical attention. Under FFS (CAP), over-
provision (under-provision) decreased (increased) as the
patient’s need for medical attention increased. Patients
in need of significant medical attention appeared to fare
considerably better under FFS than under CAP.
In our experimental design, we assumed the patients
were passive. If we removed this assumption, we would
expect reputational effects to come into play [11]. Per-
ceived over- or under-providers could thus expect pa-
tients to be more likely to reject treatment
recommendations, which in turn could potentially limit
such physician behaviour.
Limitations
As for any lab experiment, the external validity of our
findings remains an issue. Galizzi & Wiesen [26] men-
tion three limitations: (1) participation bias (subjects that
choose to participate in an experiment might be differ-
ent from those who choose not to participate), (2) envir-
onment, context, and frame of the tasks in the lab might
differ from decisions in real life, and (3) medical stu-
dents may not be representative of the medical popula-
tion. For the latter, Brosig-Koch et al. [18] and Reif et al.
[17], for example, find no consistent difference in how
physicians, medical and non-medical students respond to
financial incentives in the field or in lab experiments.
While the first limitation is a general issue with experi-
mental economics, the second one can be tackled by rede-
signing tasks and contexts in additional experiments.
Brosig-Koch et al. [27], for example, introduce competi-
tion into the experimental design of Brosig-Koch et al.
[18, 21] and find that it can reduce over-provision (under
FFS) as well as under-provision (under CAP).
In our experiment, the small number of participants
might be an issue: it might have impaired the power of
our statistical Wilcoxon tests. We investigate this issue
using the G*Power software in the context of a post-hoc
power analysis.1 The required significance level of our
two-sided tests was set at 0.01. Therefore, when the null
hypothesis (no effect) was rejected, even with only 23
observations, those tests’ power was close to 1 as ex-
pected and confirmed with the G*Power software. How-
ever, there was a difficulty in those situations, where the
null hypothesis was accepted since the sample size might
be too small to detect an effect. The power of the WTs
was minimal. We recognized that it might be challen-
ging to obtain the proper (huge) number to achieve a
relevant power to the appropriate statistical tests in lab
experiments. Furthermore, as seen in our results for the
differential in the quantity of treatment with the reduc-
tion of CAP payment, the effect is likely to be very small
if significant.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that, in our experimental model, fee
regulation could be used to some extent as a means of
controlling physician spending since we did not identify a
behavioural response to the CAP payment cut. Physicians
did not recoup lost income by altering treatment behav-
iour toward CAP and/or FFS patients. The patient benefit
under FFS and CAP thus appeared to remain unaffected
by fee regulation. This finding relates to Brosig-Koch et al.
[12] ‘s observation that, within a CAP payment system
where performance pay appears to enhance the quality of
care, the size of the bonus does not matter.
In line with the observations of HSW (2011) and
Brosig-Koch et al. [18], our findings indicate that neither
FFS nor CAP encourages physicians to provide optimal
care from a patient’s perspective. This observation sup-
ports a move away from pure payment systems toward
hybrid compensation schemes that blend the high- and
low-intensity incentives embedded in FFS and CAP. The
validity of results concerning the real world remains an
issue with lab experiments. Running costly field experi-
ments [12] and exploiting natural experiments are likely
to improve this validity. Nevertheless, the field of experi-
mental economics is a useful tool for further investigation
that considers the welfare of all those involved in the
health system and explores, for example, mixed CAP/FFS
payment systems designed to reduce the under- and over-
provision of specific health services. Another interesting
avenue of research is the study of payment incentives to
develop efficient teams of care providers.
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